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1.Introduction                                                                                                    
 
The relationship between religion and law is inherently unstable and ambivalent.1 Religion 
professes faith in God’s (or some other higher being’s) law rather than man’s. Religions want 
the protection of the law for their manifestations and beliefs and their social and institutional 
existence. However, they resist any incursion by the laws into areas where their beliefs and 
decisions are assessed for compatibility with national or international secular norms. Particular 
difficulties are created if courts try to assess religious doctrines and beliefs or subject them to 
secular standards of rationality, proportionality and non-discrimination.2 Thus religions are 
always in a troublesome dialectical relationship with the law. Major judicial decisions can 
signal the ways in which that relationship is evolving.3  In particular they can do so by revealing 
whether the law makes spaces to account for the forces of religion and how those spaces operate 
and interact with other forces.   
Nature may abhor a vacuum (horror vacui)4 but a vacuum can exist because of the 
operation of other forces, such as gravity. Abhorrence expresses the idea that empty or unfilled 
spaces are unnatural as they go against the laws of nature and physics. By analogy it can be 
argued that the rule of law similarly abhors empty or unfilled legal spaces or black holes as 
they are unnatural as they go against the rule of law.5 For a lawyer the rule of law exerts a 
magnetic sense in as much as it claims that no legal powers should be uncontrollable.6 Along 
with the normative force of human rights, this partly explains the increasingly limited scope of 
doctrines such as non-justiciability.7 One of the forces which can create empty legal spaces is 
that of religion. This article compares and contrasts three cases in three different legal arenas 
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in which this force has been at work.8 First, the unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court 
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission9 (‘Hosanna-Tabor’) in which it was held that the Establishment and Free Exercise 
Clauses of the First Amendment of the US Constitution barred suits brought on behalf of 
Ministers against their churches claiming termination in violation of employment 
discrimination laws. Second, the majority decision of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Fernández Martínez v Spain10 (‘Fernández Martínez’) will be considered. In this 
case the ECtHR held that a decision not to renew the contract of a priest, who was married with 
five children, to teach Catholic religion and morals, following the publication of an article 
disclosing his membership of the ‘Movement for Optional Celibacy’, did not violate his right 
to private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Thirdly, 
the decision of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in The President of the Methodist 
Conference v Preston (formerly Moore)11 (‘Preston’) that a Minister in a Methodist Church 
was an ‘employee’ and could, therefore, bring a claim for unfair dismissal.  
 
2. Hosanna-Tabor  
 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School was a member congregation of the 
Lutheran Church–Missouri Synod. 12  The Synod classified its school teachers into two 
categories: ‘called’ and ‘lay’. ‘Called’ teachers are regarded as having been called to their 
vocation by God. To be eligible to be considered ‘called’, a teacher must complete certain 
academic requirements, including a course of theological study. Once ‘called’, a teacher 
receives the formal title ‘Minister of Religion, Commissioned’. In contrast, ‘Lay’ teachers are 
not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. Although lay and called teachers 
at Hosanna-Tabor generally performed the same duties, lay teachers were hired only when 
called teachers were unavailable. Hosanna-Tabor asked Cheryl Perich (‘P’) to become a called 
teacher and she accepted.13 P taught secular subjects. In addition she taught a religion class, led 
her students in daily prayer and devotional exercises, and took her students to a weekly school-
wide chapel service. P led the chapel service herself about twice a year. P developed narcolepsy 
and began the 2004–2005 school year on disability leave. In January 2005, she notified the 
school principal that she would be able to report to work in February. The principal responded 
that the school had already contracted a lay teacher to fill P’s position for the remainder of the 
school year. The principal also expressed concern that P was not yet ready to return to the 
classroom. The congregation subsequently offered to pay a portion of P’s health insurance 
premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher. P refused to resign. In February 
2005, P presented herself at the school and refused to leave until she received written 
documentation that she had reported to work. The principal later called P and told her that it 
was  likely she would be fired. P responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended 
to assert her legal rights. In a subsequent letter, the chairman of the school board advised P that 
the congregation would consider whether to rescind her call at its next meeting. As grounds for 
termination, the letter cited P’s ‘insubordination and disruptive behavior’, as well as the 
damage she had done to her ‘working relationship’ with the school by ‘threatening to take legal 
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action’. The congregation voted to rescind P’s call, and Hosanna-Tabor sent her a letter of 
termination. P filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).14 The EEOC commenced a  suit against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that 
P had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. P intervened in the 
litigation. Invoking what is known as the ‘ministerial exception’, Hosanna-Tabor argued that 
the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned the employment 
relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. According to the Church, 
P was a minister, and she had been fired for a religious reason—namely, that her threat to sue 
the Church violated the Synod’s belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally. 
The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment in Hosanna Tabor’s favour. The 
Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded.15 It recognised the existence of a ministerial exception 
rooted in the First Amendment, but concluded that P did not qualify as a ‘minister’ under the 
exception. 
 In Hosanna-Tabor  the Supreme Court (SC) reversed the opinion of the Appeals Court. 
It recognised, for the first time,16 a ‘Ministerial Exception’ that precluded application of such 
legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution 
and its ministers. The exception was based on the First Amendment, which provides, in part, 
that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof’. In the SC’s view, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise 
Clause  c barred the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire 
one of its ministers. It considered that the Establishment Clause prevented the Government 
from appointing ministers and the Free Exercise Clause prevented it from interfering with the 
freedom of religious groups to select their own.17 It found support for this interpretation in 
events in the early 19th century involving James Madison, ‘the leading architect of the religion 
clauses of the First Amendment’,18 and in analogous jurisprudence concerning disputes over 
church property.19 In the latter jurisprudence the SC had made clear that it would not adjudicate 
on ecclesiastical matters such as the selection of the clergy.20 It would not even inquire into 
whether the church had followed its own procedures.21 In its central finding in Hosanna-Tabor 
the SC held that, 
 
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church 
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such 
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church 
of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing 
an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects 
a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its 
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 Per Watson v Jones 13 Wall 679 (1872); Kedroff v Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in 
North America  344 US 94 (1952), at 116. 
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appointments. According the state the power to determine which individuals will 
minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits 
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.22 
 
The SC rejected arguments that religious organisations could successfully defend against 
employment discrimination claims in those circumstances by invoking the constitutional right 
to freedom of association - a right ‘implicit’ in the First Amendment and that religious 
organisations had no protection beyond those of labour or social organisations. It stressed that 
it was the First Amendment itself, which gave ‘special solicitude to the rights of religious 
organizations’.23 The SC also rejected the argument that the free exercise clause was not 
violated by a valid and neutral law of general applicability like the ADA, per Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v Smith.24 It the Smith case on the basis 
that it involved government regulation of only outward physical acts.25 In contrast, Hosanna-
Tabor concerned government interference with an internal church decision that affected the 
faith and mission of the church itself. In Smith the SC had distinguished the issues in that case 
from the government’s ‘lend[ing] its power to one or the other side in controversies over 
religious authority or dogma’.26  
The SC then proceeded to hold that, on the facts of P’s case, the ministerial exemption 
applied. It was clear, following every Court of Appeal decision on the issue, that the ministerial 
exception was ‘not limited to the head of a religious congregation’.27 However, the SC was 
reluctant to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualified as a minister. It 
considered it sufficient to establish that P was covered. Of critical importance was the formal 
title given to P by the Church (‘Minister of Religion, Commissioned’); the substance reflected 
in that title in terms of tasks, responsibilities and training; her own use of that title; and the 
important religious functions she performed for the Church. P’s duties reflected a role in 
conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission. The SC identified one of the 
errors of the Appeals Court as being that it gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers 
at the school performed the same religious duties as P. Though relevant, this was not 
dispositive. Another error was that the Appeals Court placed too much emphasis on P’s 
performance of secular duties. The amount of time an employee spent on particular activities 
was relevant in assessing that employee’s status, but that factor could not be considered in 
isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious functions performed and the other 
considerations discussed above.28 
 The SC dealt with the suggestion, commonly made in discrimination cases, that the 
proffered ground of dismissal - that P violated the Synod’s commitment to internal dispute 
resolution - was a pretext. There was some evidence for this. It was asserted that none of 
Hosanna-Tabor’s communications with P during the relevant period mentioned the Synod’s 
dispute-resolution process or P’s failure to use it. P testified that she was not even aware of that 
process until Hosanna-Tabor raised it years later in this litigation.29 However, for the SC that 
suggestion missed the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception was not 
to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it was made for a religious 
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 494 US 872 (1990). 
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 494 US 872 at 877 (1990). 
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 Ibid. at 15-9. 
29
 See Brief for the Federal Respondent, at 8, available at: 
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reason.30 The exception instead ensured that the authority to select and control who would 
minister to the faithful - a ‘strictly ecclesiastical’31 matter - was the church’s alone.32  Thus 
religious autonomy even extends to dismissal for non-religious reasons. 
 Finally, the SC’s Opinion ends with an express acknowledgment that societal interest 
in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important.33 But, in 
the view of the SC, so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their 
beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. In the SC’s view, when a minister who 
had been fired sued her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First 
Amendment had ‘struck the balance for us’.34 The church must be free to choose those who 
will guide it on its way.  
The ‘ministerial exception’ is a judge-made exception to the civil rights laws (and 
potentially others) based on the First Amendment.35 It has been accepted by the SC even though 
the Congress had made a conscious choice to include religious employers within the scope of 
the ADA. Although it provided certain defences for religion-based discrimination in 
employment, Congress had provided no comparable defence for a religious entity that retaliated 
against its employees for invoking their rights under the statute.36 The SC expressed ‘no view 
on whether the exemption bars other types of suits’37 such as breach of contract or tortuous 
suits.38 However, it is clear that the ministerial exception is not limited to the ADA. Rather it 
bars suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in 
violation of employment discrimination laws. Although the SC states that the First Amendment 
has ‘struck the balance for us’, in fact there is no balancing in any real sense. If the exemption 
applies, it is absolute. By contrast with European jurisprudence it is odd that the balance is only 
struck in the First Amendment. There is no balancing between the rights in the First 
Amendment and those in other Amendments concerned with, for example, racial, gender and 
political equality. 39  It is notable that the SC rejected the contentions of the Obama 
administration that the First Amendment provided no general ministerial exception and that 
religious organisations were limited to only the same right to freedom of association that labour 
unions and social clubs enjoyed.40  
The ministerial exception covers both the selection of ministers and their dismissal or 
deselection. The term ‘ministerial exception’ gives a misleading impression. It potentially 
affects a very large number of people who work for religious organisations and are left with 
no protection against discrimination in the workplace. 41  It has been reported that the US 
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 Hosanna-Tabor at 20 [emphasis added]. 
31
 Per Kedroff, supra n 21, at 119. 
32
 See also the concurring opinion of Alito, joined by Kagan, in Hosanna-Tabor, at 8-10, on why probing for the 
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 Hosanna-Tabor at 20. 
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 Ibid. at 21-2. 
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36
 On statutory exemptions in US law, see Furfaro and Salins, ‘Religious Organizations Exemption’ (2008) 239 
New York Law Journal 1. 
37
 Hosanna-Tabor at 20-21. 
38
 See also Lupu and Tuttle, ‘Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity’ [2004] Brigham Young University 
Law Review 1789.   
39
 See in particular the Fourteenth Amendment on the ‘equal protection of the laws’. 
40
 See Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra n 30, at 12, para c.  
41
 Griffin, ‘The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor’ (2013) 88 Indiana Law Journal [forthcoming], available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2026046 [last accessed 1 August 2012], refers to the rejection of lawsuits by ‘elementary 
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Census identified 429,000 Americans as members of the ‘clergy’ in 2010,42 but it is clear that 
much higher numbers may fall within its scope.43 An individual may well believe, and indeed 
have been informed (as was the case with P), that they are protected by employee protection 
legislation. They may not even realise they are a ‘ministers’ until their lawsuits are dismissed. 
The SC gave only limited guidance on who might be covered by the ministerial exception and 
that guidance must now be applied by lower courts.44 Justice Thomas’ view was that the civil 
courts should defer to a religious organisation’s ‘good faith understanding of who qualifies as 
its minister’: if a religious organisation ‘sincerely considered’ a person to be a minister that 
would be sufficient for him.45 He was particularly conscious that the exemption should cover 
organisations with ‘different leadership structures and doctrines that influence their 
conceptions of ministerial status’.46 He saw the question of who was a minister as itself a 
religious question. If his approach is followed it would meet the criticisms from those who are 
protective of religious autonomy and concerned about the intrusive exploration that the courts 
need to engage in so that they can determine whether a particular role is important to the 
spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.47 Justices Alito and Kagan, in their concurring 
opinion, suggested that the focus should not be on the term ‘minister’ or any conception of 
ordination. They noted that most faiths do not employ the term ‘minister’ at all and some had 
no concept of formal ordination. Rather the focus should be on the functions performed by 
persons who worked for religious bodies. The exception should be tailored to this purpose. It 
should, therefore, apply to any employee who ‘leads a religious organization, conducts 
worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals or serves as a messenger or 
teacher of its faith’.48 For the SC the scope was clearly wider than that which the Court of 
Appeal in Hosanna-Tabor had afforded.49 Even before Hosanna-Tabor it was claimed that 
the ministerial exception had ‘rapidly expanded, in part because of the difficulty of 
determining what constituted a ministerial office given the wide variety of leadership roles in 
different religions and in part because it was difficult to contain the logic of the exception to a 
single category of workers’.50 Moreover, it had provided blanket immunity so that even cases 
that appear to be wholly divorced from religious considerations still attracted the exception, 
leading to results that have left religious employees exposed to harsh and unfair treatment.51  
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F. Supp. 2d 917 (ND Ohio 2002) (court upheld the right of a Catholic Order to dismiss a novitiate who was 
diagnosed with breast cancer). 
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3. Fernández Martínez  
 
Mr José Antonio Fernández Martínez (FM), a Spanish national, was ordained as a priest in 
1961. In 1984 he applied to the Vatican for dispensation from celibacy. 52  Before any 
dispensation had been granted he married in a civil ceremony in 1985, and he and his wife had 
five children. From 1991 onwards he was employed to teach Catholic religion and morals in 
a State high school. His contract was renewed every year by the Bishop of the Diocese of 
Cartagena. The Bishop’s agreement was necessary under an agreement between Spain and the 
Holy See of 3 January 1979. In November 1996 the Murcia newspaper La Verdad published 
an article about the ‘Movement for Optional Celibacy’ for priests. It reported that FM, a 
member of the Movement, had previously been rector of a seminary and published a 
photograph of him attending a meeting of the Movement together with his wife and their five 
children. The article included comments by a number of participants urging the ecclesiastical 
authorities to introduce optional celibacy and democracy within the Church. In particular it 
raised the possibility for the laity to elect priests and bishops. It also indicated their 
disagreement with the Church’s position on abortion, divorce, sexuality and contraception. 
On 15 September 1997 the Vatican authorities granted FM’s application for dispensation 
from celibacy, specifying that anyone granted such a dispensation was barred from teaching 
the Catholic religion in public institutions, 53  unless the local bishop decided otherwise 
‘according to his own criteria and provided that there is no scandal’ (sans risquer le scandale). 
On 29 September 1997 the Diocese of Cartagena informed the Ministry of Education of its 
intention not to renew FM’s contract for the 1997/98 school year. The Ministry notified FM of 
the decision. The Bishop’s view was not based on his status as a married priest or as the father 
of five children. Rather it was that FM had indeed caused a ‘scandal’ by acting as a public 
spokesman for the Movement for the rights of priests to be married, by publicly presenting 
views in opposition to those of the Catholic authorities (on abortion, divorce etc) and by the 
publication of these views in the newspapers along with a photograph. It was on the basis of 
these factors that he could not be allowed to continue to be a teacher of Catholic religion and 
so his declaration of suitability had to be withdrawn. 
FM appealed to the Murcia employment tribunal. That tribunal found that he had been 
discriminated against because of his civil status and his membership of the Movement for 
Optional Celibacy. It declared his dismissal null and void and ordered his reinstatement in his 
former post. The Ministry of Education, the regional education authority and the Catholic 
Diocese appealed. The High Court of Justice allowed the appeal. It examined the question 
of the bond of trust between the teacher and the Bishop, and emphasised the Bishop’s 
prerogatives in ensuring that individuals in FM’s position carried out their duties with 
discretion, making sure that their personal situation was not a source of scandal. If their situation 
became a public matter, it was the Bishop’s duty not to renew their teaching contract. The 
Spanish appeal court noted that for the purposes of Article 10(2) of the ECHR, the restrictions 
imposed on FM’s rights had to be considered proportionate to the aim pursued, namely the 
avoidance of scandal. The nature of the contract – the fact that it had to be renewed annually by 
the bishop – made it a temporary contract, which had simply expired. FM had therefore not 
been dismissed.  
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 In 2006, Vatican and other sources estimated that approximately 100,000 Catholic priests had abandoned their 
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FM lodged an amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. On 4 June 2007 the 
Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal. It highlighted the special role of teachers of religious 
education in Spain and found that the reasons for not renewing FM’s contract had been 
purely religious. It further held that it would be unreasonable for the selection process for 
teachers of religious education not to take into account the candidates’ religious beliefs. It 
considered that the duty of neutrality of the Spanish state with respect to religion in Article 16(3) 
of the Spanish Constitution meant that it could not evaluate the notion of ‘scandal’ in terms of 
canonical law and could do no more than satisfy itself that the refusal to renew FM’s contract 
had been for exclusively religious reasons.  
Relying on Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR, FM alleged that the non-renewal of his 
contract because of his personal and family situation had infringed his right to respect for 
his private and family life before the ECtHR. He complained that he had been 
discriminated against and that the public disclosure of his status as a married priest with several 
children formed part of his freedom of expression.54 The ECtHR framed the question as 
whether the State was required to give precedence to FM’s right under Article 8 (right to 
respect for private life) over the rights of the Church under Articles 9 (right to freedom of 
religion) and 11 (freedom of association) and whether it had afforded him sufficient protection. 
The ECtHR observed that under Spanish law the concept of autonomy of religious 
communities was accompanied by the principle of State neutrality in religious matters. 
This approach prevented the State from expressing a position on issues such as celibacy for 
priests. The ECtHR acknowledged that this obligation of neutrality was not unlimited. The 
Constitutional Court had confirmed on 4 June 2007 that restrictions could be imposed in this 
sphere through judicial review of decisions by the Bishop, who was required to respect 
fundamental rights and freedoms. However, the definition of the religious or moral criteria 
that served as a basis for not renewing a candidate’s contract was the exclusive prerogative 
of the religious authority. The domestic courts could weigh up the competing fundamental 
rights at stake and examine whether the decision not to renew the contract had been based on 
anything other than strictly religious factors, those being the sole aspects protected by 
religious freedom. FM had had the opportunity to bring his case before the employment 
tribunal and the Murcia High Court of Justice, and had ultimately been able to lodge an 
amparo appeal with the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the decision dispensing him from 
celibacy had specified that anyone granted such a dispensation was barred from teaching the 
Catholic religion in public institutions except by permission of the bishop.  
The ECtHR agreed with the Constitutional Court that the grounds upon which FM had not had 
his contract renewed were of a strictly religious nature.55 Significantly, the requirements of the 
principles of religious freedom and neutrality prevented the ECtHR from further consideration 
of the necessity and proportionality of the decision not to renew. Rather the ECtHR held that 
its role should be limited to verifying that the fundamental principles of domestic law or the 
complainant's dignity were not compromised.56 The non-renewal decision had only been taken 
after the article had been published, publicity given to the seminar and the arguments against the 
teachings of the church made public. It was these events that led the Bishop to consider that the 
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special bond of confidence (lien de confiance spécial) required was broken and to not renew 
the contract.57  The bond necessarily implied certain specificities (in the sense of professional 
requirements) which differentiated teachers of Catholic religion and morals from other teachers.58 
The ECtHR held that the conclusions of the Spanish domestic courts were not unreasonable.59 
When FM had begun to teach he had not yet received a waiver from the Vatican that made him 
a ‘married priest’ in the eyes of the Catholic Church. In protecting the collective dimension 
religious of religious freedom, account could be taken of the religious convictions of FM, including 
the obligations of loyalty FM had submitted to in accepting the dispensation from the Vatican. The 
ECtHR compared FM’s obligations with those in the case of Obst,60 in which a Director of Public 
Relations for Europe for the Mormon church who, having grown up in the Church, was or 
should have been aware, when signing his contract, of the importance of marital fidelity to his 
employer. Therefore he should have been aware of the incompatibility of the extra-marital 
relations he had chosen to establish with the increased obligations of loyalty he owed to the 
Church as a Director.  
The Court also contrasted FM’s obligations with those in the case of Schüth,61 an organist 
and choirmaster in a Catholic parish. In his case the ECtHR considered that although there 
were obligations of loyalty to the Catholic Church, S’s signature of his contract could not be 
interpreted as an unequivocal personal commitment to live in abstinence in separation or 
divorce. Such an interpretation would affect the core of the right to respect for privacy of the 
person concerned, especially since, as the labour courts had found, S was not subject to 
increased duties of loyalty. S had stated that he could not prevent the separation from his wife 
for strictly personal reasons and that it was not possible to live in abstinence until the end of its 
days, as would require the canonical code of the Catholic. S’s situation did not concern the 
dismissal of a person because of his public statements against the moral position of his church 
employer. S had not publicised his position and in 14 years of service to the parish, he had not 
fought the positions of the Catholic Church. Rather he had simply failed to observe them in 
practice in matters that were at the core of S’s private life.  By contrast, FM had not been 
unwillingly exposed by the Press. Rather he had, along with others in the Movement, openly 
expressed their disagreement with the policies of the Church in several areas.62 The particular 
nature of the professional requirements imposed on FM was due to the fact that they had been 
established by an employer whose ethics was based on religion or belief. The competent 
national courts had sufficiently demonstrated that the obligations of loyalty were acceptable, 
in that they were intended to preserve the sensitivity of the public and the parents of the pupils 
of the school. The reasoning of those courts was sufficiently detailed.63 In addition, the ECtHR 
considered that the requirement of reserve and discretion was all the more important given that 
the direct recipients of the teachings of FM were minor children, who were vulnerable and 
impressionable by nature.64 The ECtHR also noted that after the non-renewal FM had found 
work in a museum and continued to work there until retirement.65 In conclusion, having regard 
to the state’s margin of appreciation and the fact that the competent courts had struck a ‘fair 
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balance’ between several private interests, the Court unanimously found that there had been 
no violation of Article 8.66 
The ECtHR accepted the argument of the Spanish Constitutional Court that the nature 
of the ‘motivé’ (reasons) for the non-renewal were strictly religious.67 It stressed that Spanish 
law guaranteed religious communities a degree of autonomy and that the Spanish Constitution 
recognised the principle of the religious neutrality of the state. The Spanish Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of this principle had included an appreciation of the necessity to balance 
individual rights against the rights of the Church. However, the ECtHR effectively deferred to 
the Church’s autonomous assessment as (and this was noted by Judge ad hoc Saiz Arnaiz) the 
ECtHR did not engage in a balancing exercise. Instead, it deferred to the balancing exercise 
undertaken by the national court. An observer of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence might well have 
expected that court to insist on a balancing exercise and, therefore, for much to turn on the 
proportionality of the decision on the facts of the case.68 This is what the ECtHR had done in 
Obst v Germany69  and Schüth v Germany,70 in which it held that the domestic courts were 
required to balance the rights of both parties; and that such a balancing exercise included the 
proximity of the activity of the applicant to the mission of the Church, the specific nature of 
post concerned and the possibility for the applicant to find new employment.  
Mr Schüth, had been the organist and choirmaster in the Catholic parish of St Lambert 
in Essen since the mid-1980s, when he separated from his wife in 1994. From 1995 onwards 
he lived with his new partner. In July 1997, after his children had spoken in kindergarten about 
the fact that their father was going to have another child, the dean of the parish held a meeting 
with S. A few days later, the parish informed him of his dismissal as of April 1998, on the 
grounds that he had violated the basic regulations of the Catholic Church on employment with 
the Church. In particular, by engaging in an extra-marital relationship with another woman who 
expected a child from him, he had not only committed adultery but was also guilty of bigamy. 
Obst grew up in the Mormon faith and married in 1980 in accordance with Mormon rites. After 
holding various positions within the Mormon Church, he was appointed to the post of Director 
of Public Relations for Europe in 1986. Obst’s marriage had been deteriorating for years and 
that he had an affair with another woman. Obst was dismissed without notice. Obst was 
subsequently excommunicated by way of an internal disciplinary procedure.  
Both Schüth’s and Obst’s proceedings in the national courts failed. The Federal Labour 
Court referred to a leading judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of 4 June 1985 
concerning the lawfulness of the dismissal of Church employees after a violation of their 
loyalty obligations. Following this judgment, Church employers had the right to govern their 
affairs in an autonomous manner, while at the same time labour courts were bound by the 
principles of the Church employers’ religious and moral precepts to the extent that they did not 
conflict with the fundamental principles of the legal order of the State. The requirements of the 
Catholic Church concerning marital fidelity were not considered to conflict with the 
fundamental principles of the legal order. With respect to Schüth, given his determined stance 
to uphold his new relationship, the dean had rightly been able to assume that an advance 
warning would have been superfluous. The court held that the parish could not continue 
employing him as organist without losing all credibility, as his activity was closely connected 
to the Church’s mission. Schüth’s complaint to the Federal Constitutional Court was dismissed 
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with reference to its leading judgment of 4 June 1985. With respect to Obst the national court 
held that he had not honoured the obligations arising from provisions in his work contract. 
According to the Federal Labour Court, the requirements of the Mormon Church regarding 
marital fidelity did not conflict with the fundamental principles of the legal order, because 
marriage was also of pre-eminent importance under the German Basic Law. The dismissal had 
been necessary for the Church to keep its credibility, which was under threat in view of Obst’s 
responsibilities as Director of Public Relations for Europe. Moreover, the Church had not been 
obliged to give an advance warning, as, given his long career with the Church, Obst must have 
been aware of the severity of his misconduct. Again the Federal Constitutional Court dismissed 
a constitutional complaint with reference to its leading judgment of 4 June 1985. 
The ECtHR unanimously concluded that there had been no violation of Article 8 in 
Obst’s case but that there had been a violation of Article 8 in Schüth’s case. What is of 
significance for our purposes is that in both cases the ECtHR examined whether the balance 
struck by the German labour courts, between the applicants’ right to respect for their private 
life under Article 8 on the one hand and the ECHR rights of the Catholic and the Mormon 
churches on the other, had afforded the applicants sufficient protection. It reiterated that the 
autonomy of religious communities was protected against undue interference by the State under 
Article 9 (freedom of religion) read in the light of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and 
association). By putting in place a system of labour courts and a constitutional court having 
jurisdiction to review the former courts’ decisions, Germany had, in principle, complied with 
its positive obligations towards litigants in the area of employment law. The applicants had 
been able to bring their cases before a labour court with jurisdiction to determine whether the 
dismissal had been lawful under State labour law while having regard to ecclesiastical labour 
law. In both cases, the Federal Labour Court had found that the requirements of the Mormon 
Church and the Catholic Church, respectively, regarding marital fidelity did not conflict with 
the fundamental principles of the legal order.  
As regards Obst, the ECtHR observed that the German labour courts had taken account 
of all the relevant factors and undertaken a careful and thorough balancing exercise regarding 
the interests involved. They had pointed out that the Mormon Church had only been able to 
base Obst’s dismissal on his adultery because he had informed the Church of it by his own 
initiative. According to the German courts’ findings, his dismissal amounted to a necessary 
measure aimed at preserving the Church’s credibility, having regard in particular to the nature 
of his post. The courts had explained why the Church had not been obliged to inflict a less 
severe penalty, such as a warning, and they had underlined that the injury suffered by Obst as 
a result of his dismissal was limited, having regard among other things to his relatively young 
age. Importantly, the fact that, after a thorough balancing exercise, the German courts had given 
more weight to the interests of the Mormon Church than to those of Obst, did not, of itself, 
raise an issue under the ECHR. The conclusion that Obst had not been subject to unacceptable 
obligations was reasonable, given that, having grown up in the Mormon Church, he had, or 
should have, been aware when signing the employment contract of the importance of marital 
fidelity for his employer and of the incompatibility of his extra-marital relationship with the 
increased duties of loyalty he had contracted towards the Church as director for Europe of the 
public relations department. 
By contrast, as regards Schüth, the ECtHR observed that the labour court of appeal had 
confined itself to stating that while his functions as organist and choirmaster did not fall within 
the group of employees who in case of serious misconduct had to be dismissed, namely those 
working in counselling, in catechesis or in a leading position, his functions were nonetheless 
so closely connected to the Catholic Church’s proclamatory mission that the parish could not 
continue employing him without losing all credibility. That court had not examined this 
argument any further but appeared to have simply reproduced the opinion of the Church 
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employer on this point. The labour courts had moreover made no mention of Schüth’s de facto 
family life or of the legal protection afforded to it. The interests of the Church employer had 
thus not been balanced against Schüth’s right to respect for his private and family life, but only 
against his interest in keeping his post. A more detailed examination would have been required 
when weighing the competing rights and interests at stake. While the ECtHR accepted that in 
signing the employment contract, Schüth had entered into a duty of loyalty towards the Catholic 
Church that limited his right to respect for his private life to a certain degree, his signature on 
the contract could not be interpreted as an unequivocal undertaking to live a life of abstinence 
in the event of separation or divorce. The German labour courts had given only marginal 
consideration to the fact that Schüth’s case had not received media coverage and that, after 14 
years of service for the parish, he did not appear to have challenged the position of the Catholic 
Church. The fact that an employee who had been dismissed by a church employer had only 
limited opportunities of finding another job was also of particular importance. This was all the 
more so where the dismissed employee had special qualifications that made it difficult, or even 
impossible, to find a new job outside the Church, as was the case with Schüth, who now worked 
part-time in a Protestant parish. In that connection the ECtHR noted that the rules of the 
Protestant Church relating to church musicians stipulated that non-members of the Protestant 
Church might only be employed in exceptional cases and solely in the context of an additional 
job. In conclusion, the ECtHR found that the German labour courts had failed to weigh Schüth’s 
rights against those of the Church employer in a manner compatible with the ECHR. 
The careful balancing approach in these cases was followed in Siebenhaar v Germany,71 
which concerned a conflict between the rights of a church and the rights of an individual to 
religious freedom. The ECtHR found no violation in S’s dismissal from her job in a 
kindergarten run by a Protestant parish on the grounds of her active involvement in another 
religious community, the Universal Church of Humanity. The Protestant Church in Germany 
required loyalty from its employees. One consequence of this was that employees should not 
be members of or collaborate with organisations whose principles contradicted those of the 
Protestant Church. In Siebenhaar the German labour courts had taken account of all the 
relevant factors and undertaken a careful and thorough balancing exercise regarding the 
interests involved. According to the courts’ findings, S’s dismissal had been necessary to 
preserve the Church’s credibility, which outweighed her interest in keeping her job. The courts 
had also taken into consideration the relatively short duration of her employment. As with Obst, 
the fact that, after that thorough balancing exercise, they had given more weight to the interests 
of the Protestant Church than to those of S did not itself raise an issue under the ECHR. The 
ECtHR also found the German labour courts’ findings reasonable. S had, or should have, been 
aware from the moment of signing her employment contract that her activities for the Universal 
Church were incompatible with her work for the Protestant Church.72  
The balancing approach in Obst, Schüth and Siebenhaar represented a notable change 
in jurisprudence from the previous approach under which virtually absolute weight was given 
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to the interests of the various churches on the basis that the individual always had the right of 
exit if they disagreed with, or wished to engage in practices contrary to, those interests.73 As 
Evans and Hood have acknowledged, the balancing approach is far more complicated for 
religious groups to predict or comply with than the procedural limitations as ‘[t]hey may 
require them to give—or at least feign giving—consideration to secular values that they may 
not share (such as respect for the private or family life of those that it considers to be living in 
relationships that do not deserve respect).’74 It creates unpredictability as to whether domestic 
courts, after weighing a range of complex factors, will uphold their religious autonomy in 
particular cases or not.75 As they note, ‘[t]he best outcome of this weighing and balancing 
approach might be one that will encourage both sides to try to act reasonably in coming to a 
fair outcome. The worst will be increased litigation and micromanagement of employment 
decisions by courts’.76 
The ECtHR went to great lengths to explain how its approach in the Fernández Martínez sat 
with its approach in the German cases. It stressed that FM had not hidden from the press and 
had thus contributed to the publicity given to his private and family life, while the applicant 
in Schüth had not taken such action. FM had been able to rely on unemployment benefits and 
had found a job at a museum after his dismissal, while one of the features of the Schüth case 
had been that the applicant had faced major difficulties in finding new employment.  The 
primary argument used by the ECtHR to distinguish Fernández Martínez from the need for 
ad hoc balancing in Schüth, Obst and Siebenhaar concerned the nature of the FM’s functions. 
It observed that all its previous judgments in similar cases [which cases did it refer to] had 
concerned measures taken by church authorities vis-à-vis lay persons, whilst FM was a 
‘secularised priest’. The Court also considered that, unlike the applicant in Schüth, he had 
been under an increased obligation of loyalty, which he had violated – in the eyes of the 
Church – when he became publicly known as a ‘married priest’, thereby causing a ‘scandal’. 
However, the applicant in Obst had also been under an increased obligation of loyalty 
according to the Court. Therefore, it was arguably the nature of the FM’s position as a priest 
that wished to continue to teach Catholic morals that set Fernández Martínez apart from the 
previous cases, leading the ECtHR to accept the Spanish courts’ balancing, instead of 
insisting on a more thorough ad hoc balancing.   
 
4. Preston  
 
The protection of individual religious freedom and the autonomy of religious organisations 
within the jurisdictions of the UK are legally and politically complex.77 There are degrees of 
free exercise and of formal and informal establishment.78 These are now overlaid by the rights 
protected by the ECHR via the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Following a period as a Probationer Minister, M was ordained as a Methodist Minister 
in 2003.79 In 2006 she was appointed to the post of Superintendant Minister to the Redruth 
Circuit in Cornwall.  In June 2009 she submitted a letter of resignation. In September 2009 she 
commenced proceedings in the Employment Tribunal (ET) alleging unfair constructive 
dismissal.  Her claim raised a preliminary issue of whether was she an ‘employee’ of the 
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Church within the meaning of s. 230 of the Employment Rights Act 199680 The ET, following 
the 1984 decision of the Court of Appeal in President of the Methodist Conference v Parfitt,81 
held that she was not an employee of the Church and so dismissed the claim. The essence of 
the decision in Parfitt was that the relationship between a Minister and a Church was a spiritual 
one, not a contractual one. There was a rebuttable presumption of an absence of intention to 
create legal relations. Dillon LJ saw no good reason why ‘modern economic conditions or the 
development of social security and employment protection should lead to a different conclusion 
now’ 82  M appealed. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) 83  allowed the appeal, 
concluding that the reasoning in Parfitt could not be sustained in the light of 2006 decision of 
the House of Lords in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland.84 In Percy, 
a female Minister of the Church of Scotland, was held to have had ‘a contract personally to 
execute…work’ for the purposes of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.85 In Percy the HL saw 
‘no cogent reason today to draw a distinction between a post whose duties are primarily 
religious and a post within the Church where this is not so’.86 It considered that it was ‘time to 
recognise’ that employment arrangements between a church and its ministers should not lightly 
be taken as intended to have no legal effect ‘and, in consequence, its ministers denied 
[statutory] protection’.87  In Preston88 the Court of Appeal upheld the reasoning and decision 
of the EAT. M’s relationship with the Church was contractual and the contract was one of 
‘employment’. The Court considered that in Percy the House of Lords had rejected the idea 
that there was a rebuttable presumption that there was no intention to create legal relations.89 
Without more evidence, it was illegitimate to rely on the spiritual nature of the role to create 
such a presumption or to rely on it as the basis of a specific finding of no such intention.90  
The Methodist Church sought to rely on Article 9 of the ECHR. However, the Court of 
Appeal regarded the potential role of Article 9 in such cases as modest.  It cited the view of 
Arden LJ in New Testament Church of God v Stewart91 that the fact that in an employment 
dispute one party to the litigation was a religious body or that the other party was a minister of 
religion did not of itself engage Article 9.  For Article 9 to be engaged there must be religious 
beliefs that are contrary to, or inconsistent with, the implication of the contract or a contract of 
employment.  It followed that the implication of a contract of employment was not 
automatically an interference with religious beliefs. 92  The Court of Appeal was doubtful 
whether giving one party contractual or statutory remedies could be regarded as a limitation or, 
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an interference with, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion under Article 9 
even if was contrary to the to the belief of one of the parties, there was, or should be, no 
contract.93  
The Methodist Church made reference to Church doctrine on Ministers as ‘stewards’ and 
that their office depending on the call of God. However, for the Court of Appeal, this 
‘priesthood of all believers’ (the idea that every member of the Church has a responsibility to 
teach and expound the Christian faith) did not embrace a doctrinal belief that a Minister who 
was treated with unfairness or discrimination must be denied common legal redress.94 The 
Methodist Church submitted that the existence of a contract of employment might interfere 
with the right of Methodists to manifest their religious belief because of the implications of 
accountability in an employment tribunal  and the financial costs involved. For the Court of 
Appeal this only served to emphasise the ‘unattractiveness and moral poverty of the attempted 
invocation of Article 9 in this case’.95  The Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT’s conclusion 
that this was not a case where the evidence established that the existence of a contract of 
employment between the Church and a Minister was contrary to its tenets and it could not 
conceive that any claim within the jurisdiction of an  employment tribunal would require it to 
determine disputed issues of doctrine.96 Thus the UK courts do not see a need for a Hosanna-
Tabor-type immunity as the mechanism for staying away from getting involved in determining 
doctrinal issues. 97  Having established that a Minister could be an employee, it is for an 
employment tribunal to decide on the facts whether or not the statutory criteria of unfairness 
or discrimination has been met in any individual case.98 As noted, any degree of balancing of 
rights necessarily gives less protection to the interest of religious organisations in autonomy 
than does a Ministerial exception.  
 
Treating ministers as employees brings them within the scope of employment protection. 
If a minister is found to be an employee, any decision to dismiss will be unfair unless a 
potentially fair reason is provided, such as conduct, capability or some other substantial reason 
justifying the dismissal. The breadth of the catch-all some other substantial reason gives scope 
for religious reasons to be the justifying reason for dismissal. Once the fair reason is 
established, then it needs to be shown that it was reasonable to rely on that reason. Again the 
religious context can then be taken into account in assessing reasonableness. For discrimination 
law, if the discrimination is indirect, then it can be justified if for a legitimate aim and 
proportionate. Both these terms would be interpreted taking the religious context into account. 
For direct discrimination, it will only be lawful if the occupational requirement is shown, again 
needing to be proportionate and again allowing religion to be taken into account. 
However, that law may itself give a specific and narrowly defined space to the protection 
of the autonomy interests of religious organisations via exemptions. Beyond those exemptions, 
it is arguable that what is fair or non-discriminatory for a religious organisation to do to its 
employees might well not be fair or non-discriminatory (in terms of a reasonable and objective 
justification) for a secular organisation to do to its employees.  A practical problem is that 
views of religious organisations are not monolithic. Within any particular Church or faith there 
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may be a broad range of views. Their constituent members and constituent elements may have 
a spectrum of views in relation to the conduct of a particular person. What is done by one 
institution within a religious organisation might not be done in another.  What is tolerated in 
one may not be tolerated in another. Courts and tribunals will have to be sensitive to these 
differences. 
Treating ministers as employees will normally make the application of the principle of 
the employer’s vicarious liability for the employee clearer. However, vicarious liability 
involves different and more complex policy objectives. It can extend beyond the employee 
context to one where the relationship is sufficiently akin or close in character to employment99 
or where a body exercised effective control over the work done by particular persons.100 The 
decisions are fact specific and the UK courts are now more open to the idea of dual vicarious 
liability.101  
 
5. Legal Spaces or Black Holes  
 
Obviously the approaches of the respective courts in the decisions considered above have to be 
understood within their own legal and political contexts.102  Nonetheless, there are many 
respects in which the contrasts are striking. As with any other legal immunity,103 the Ministerial 
exception in Hosanna-Tabor is highly protective of the interest it protects, which in that case 
was the autonomy of religious organisations. US discrimination laws already contain specific 
defences for religious organisations, but the ministerial exception is a wider immunity 
stemming from an interpretation of the US Constitution. There is no procedural protection, as 
US courts will not even inquire into whether a particular Church has followed its own 
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procedures.104 It is also notable that the SC included no reference to any comparative law or to 
international human rights treaties or jurisprudence.105 
Even within the context of US constitutional law, however, the ministerial exception 
seems open to criticism. 106  It has been suggested that it is constitutes a profound 
misinterpretation of the First Amendment and is based on a narrow and limited historical 
understanding.107 The exception effectively allows religious organisations to discriminate but 
justify it on a doctrinal pretext.108 Its scope is very wide in terms of the personnel it covers. No 
matter how clear the discrimination on the facts those individuals are left defenceless. The 
overarching criticism is that which attends all immunities, namely that the beneficiaries, in this 
case the religious organisations, are effectively placed above or outside of the law and so 
entitled to disobey it.109 Hosanna-Tabor appears to create a legal vacuum where the law does 
not go. It creates a vacuum in the sense that it is a space which is empty of legal principles. The 
decision of the religious authority is not controlled or regulated by law. Absolute and arbitrary 
power is subject to no legal control. Women are likely to be disproportionately affected in 
terms of gender discrimination (one case concerned resort to in vitro fertilisation), pregnancy 
discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment and unequal pay.110 No matter 
how suspect the ground of discrimination – even race - the exception applies. Although 
Hosanna-Tabor was an explicitly discrimination case (disability discrimination), the SC 
affirmed the doctrine and application of a ministerial exception beyond this area. Even what 
would be a directly discriminatory measure escapes being subjected to any legal principles or 
standards of review. Thus Churches are not subjected to discrimination laws, many of which 
they have actively supported as consistent with their own religious values and beliefs, as long 
as narrow statutory exemptions are granted to them. Religious individuals must obey neutral 
laws of general applicability (per Smith), but not so for religious institutions which, ironically, 
become a law unto themselves.111 If Obst (a director of public relations),112 Schüth (an organist 
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and choirmaster)113 and Siebenhaar (a kindergarten teacher in a Church school) had been in 
America it appears their cases would have fallen within the ministerial exception. All of this 
leaves religious organisations subject to criticism particularly when they themselves claim the 
benefit of constitutional or human rights.114 It gives ammunition to those who are hostile to the 
notion of giving religions increased autonomy.115  
Central to the ruling in Hosanna-Tabor was acceptance of the Church’s view that it was 
contrary to religious belief to sue the Church. The UK courts have accepted that if there was a 
religious belief that there was no enforceable contractual relationship, then that is a factor in 
determining whether the parties must be taken to have intended to enter into a legally binding 
contract.116 But that would be a very rare case.117 It would necessarily require the court to 
determine as a fact whether or not a contractual relationship would be inconsistent with 
religious doctrine or text or with the practice and beliefs at the particular religious institution.118 
The SC in Hosanna-Tabor clearly saw litigation between a religious body and a minister of 
religion as raising central issues of religious freedom. By contrast, in Moore/ Preston the CA 
was doubtful that if, contrary to the belief of one of the parties, that there was, or should be, no 
contract, the court gave the other party contractual or statutory remedies, that could be regarded 
as a limitation or, an interference with, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
under Article 9 ECHR.119  
In Hosanna-Tabor the SC was strongly influenced by historical incidents going back 
to the early 19th century. This weighed much more heavily than the societal interest protected 
by employment discrimination statutes.120 In Percy and Moore it was the modern context of 
statutory protection for employees that had led to the inclusion of Ministers as employees.121 
In Hosanna-Tabor the SC made no reference to regional or international human rights. In 
Moore raised but dismissed the relevance of Article 9 ECHR on the facts. The CA’s description 
of the attempted invocation of Article 9 as reflecting ‘moral poverty’ is striking.122 
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On the face of it, the decision of the ECtHR in Fernandez-Martinez looks as though it 
creates a similar legal vacuum to Hosanna-Tabor by appearing to move towards a similar 
ministerial exception.123 However, it is submitted that such an appearance is deceptive. The 
jurisprudence does not create such a vacuum. Rather there is a small black hole and even within 
it there is some matter in terms of applicable legal principles. There must be a balancing of the 
rights of religious organisations against the rights of individuals.124 Any degree of balancing 
of rights necessarily gives less protection to the interest of religious organisations than does a 
Ministerial exception. The decisions of the national courts must be reasoned and reasonable. A 
contractual acceptance of obligations of loyalty will be given weight. So too will the religious 
beliefs of a person who wishes to engage in teaching the morals or ethics of a particular religion. 
This is to preserve the right to religious freedom in its collective dimension. The ECtHR’s 
role is limited to verifying that the fundamental principles of the internal legal order and the 
dignity of the individual have been maintained. Admittedly, it will not go further and examine 
the necessity and proportionality of a particular decision of non-renewal. However, the state 
must remain within its margin of appreciation and a ‘fair balance’ must be maintained 
between the various private interests. In Fernandez-Martinez the ECtHR went to great pains 
to explain how the decision in that case was distinguishable on the facts, rather than on 
principle, from the balancing approach taken in Obst and Schüth.     
Would the presence of clear discrimination on ECHR grounds be relevant? If  the 
Hosanna-Tabor school had been in Europe it is doubtful that the reasons for P’s dismissal 
would have been seen as anything other than a pretext and would not have been protected by 
any ministerial immunity. If the school had been in the UK then the courts would have required 
the clearest of evidence to establish that the existence of a contract of employment between the 
Church and P was contrary to its tenets. Allowing P to bring disability discrimination 
proceedings would not have been regarded as a limitation of, or an interference with, the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of the religious organisation under Article 9 of 
the ECHR. In Fernandez-Martinez the ECtHR found that FM had not been discriminated 
against. What if there was a clearer allegation on the facts of discrimination covered by the 
ECHR?  Case 51/2011 of the Spanish Constitutional Court125  concerned Ms Resurreción 
Galera, a practicing teacher of the Catholic religion in a state school, who married a divorcee 
in a civil ceremony. The Diocesan Bishop failed to renew her contract of employment. His 
agreement was necessary under he same agreement involved in the Fernandez-Martinez case. 
The Constitutional Court held that the failure to renew the employment contract due to her 
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marital status violated the Spanish Constitution. It discriminated against her on grounds of her 
personal beliefs (Article 14 of the Constitution), interfered with her ideological freedom 
(Articled 16 of the Constitution) and interfered with her right to contract matrimony with full 
legal equality (Article 32 of the Constitution). The Constitutional Court stated that the fact that 
Ms Galera had contracted civil marriage to a divorced man (which was the only reason given 
by the Bishop of Almería to justify his decision) was unrelated with the carried out educational 
she carried out and did not affect her knowledge or teaching skills. That decision effectively 
reversed a 2007 decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court.126 What if the Constitutional 
Court had maintained its 2007 decision? The ECtHR might still have held, as long as the 
national courts had sought to balance the respective interests in the case, such a decision would 
not have been unreasonable. Maintaining freedom of religion in its collective dimension will 
require that some aspects of discrimination are compromised. As Moon has observed, the 
principle of religious neutrality, that the state should neither favour nor disfavour a particular 
religious belief system, is ‘unworkable when applied to religious community beliefs that 
address the rights and interests of others in the community’.127 Male only priesthoods are the 
classic example. Gay marriages are a contemporary example.  
However, the ECtHR’s reference to verifying that the fundamental principles of 
domestic law and the dignity of the individual have not been compromised may hint at some 
limits. Courts may accept that they have no authority or competence to interpret religious 
texts,128 but they are more likely to assert that they have a particular institutional expertise129 
with respect to issues of discrimination.130 The ECtHR is particularly alert to allegations of 
discrimination on grounds of race, sex and, increasingly, sexual orientation.131 It will require 
weighty reasons to justify such discrimination. Religious doctrines will have weight in the 
balance but they will have to be narrow, specific and ‘strictly religious’.132 In Hosanna-Tabor 
it seemed clear that the given reason for a dismissal could be a pretext but the US courts will 
not look behind the reasons given. In Fernandez-Martinez and other cases the ECtHR has 
closely examined the situation to ensure that the reason given was solely based on ‘strictly 
religious factors’.133 
In Obst and Schüth the ECtHR referred to the positive obligations of states towards 
litigants in the area of employment law. Methodist Conference v Preston is also clearly the 
product of modern rule of law thinking about the need for the statutory protection of individuals 
from discrimination and unfairness.134 In practice it means that the Churches are subject to 
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modern day employment legislation. However, the force of religion still exerts a distinct 
pressure because religious doctrine will strongly factor into the equation in determining 
whether a particular dismissal is fair or discriminatory. The force of religion may render a 
dismissal fair which would otherwise be classified as unfair and non-discriminatory what 
would otherwise be discriminatory. 
American constitutional jurisprudence has long been a classical first point of reference 
for human rights scholars.135 However, it is submitted that in terms of protecting religious 
autonomy of religious organisations the ministerial exception is rather a blunt legal doctrine. 
In some cases it operates to defend the indefensible. ECtHR and British jurisprudence offers 
more sophisticated, balanced and elegant mechanisms to protect such organisational autonomy 
in cases where it can be justified. Churches and religious organisations will have a better chance 
of defending their autonomy if there is an open and principled engagement with other legal 
principles that express important contemporary values. A ministerial exception makes religious 
support for anti-discrimination laws appear hypocritical. It is submitted that hiding in legal 
vacuums or black holes like the ministerial exception is a short-term and short-sighted strategy 
that religious organisations should resist.        
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